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Abstract
This paper gives a general view of the new macroeconomics: the
new Keynesian macroeconomics, the real business cycle models and
the analysis of credibility of monetary policy. An outline of the chief
technical features that distinguish the new Keynesian and the real
business cycle formulations is provided, highlighting the speciﬁc char-
acteristics that have been reconciled by the recent literature on credi-
bility analysis. The point to be illustrated is that the combination of
new Keynesian market failures and the new classical general equi-
librium approach to macroeconomics leads to better microeconomic
foundation for the credibility analyses of monetary policy that follow
the Barro-Gordon notion of inﬂation bias of discretionary monetary
policy.
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Resumo
O artigo fornece uma vis˜ ao geral de trˆ es importantes
ramos de pesquisa na moderna macroeconomia: os modelos novo key-
nesianos, a teoria dos ciclos reais e a an´ alise de credibilidade de
pol´ ıtica monet´ aria. De um lado, a mola propulsora da macroeconomia
novo keynesiana foi a necessidade de fornecer fundamentos mi-
croeconˆ omicos para as hip´ oteses ad hoc de rigidez nominal, nas quais
se baseava a macroeconomia keynesiana. De outro lado, a vulnerabi-
lidade te´ orica dos modelos de credibilidade do tipo Barro-Gordon es-
tava na arbitrariedade das hip´ oteses sobre comportamento do governo
num contexto da curva de Phillips e na decorrente falta de signiﬁcado
microeconˆ omico da no¸ c˜ ao de vi´ es inﬂacion´ ario da pol´ ıtica monet´ aria
discricion´ aria. Esse artigo fornece um breve apanhado das princi-
pais caracter´ ısticas t´ ecnicas que diferenciam as abordagens novo key-
nesiana e novo cl´ assica, enfatizando aquelas que, ao se fundirem, pos-
sibilitam uma melhor fundamenta¸ c˜ ao para os modelos de credibilidade
de pol´ ıtica monet´ aria do tipo Barro-Gordon. O ponto a ser ilustrado
´ e que uma melhor microfundamenta¸ c˜ ao dos modelos de credibilidade
somente se torna poss´ ıvel com fus˜ ao da macroeconomia novo cl´ assica
e novo keynesiana, com modelos de equil´ ıbrio geral pleno, do tipo
dos novos cl´ assicos, mas com caracter´ ısticas tipicamente keynesianas,
como contratos de trabalho e rigidez de pre¸ cos/sal´ arios nominais.
1 Introduction
Throughout the 1980s macroeconomic analysis was characterised by
enthusiastic developments in the new Keynesian and new classical
macroeconomics. The adjective “new” is added because both ap-
proaches are reformulations of the traditional Keynesian and classical
views by taking notice of the rational expectation revolution and the
Lucas critique, launched by Lucas (1972) and then Sargent and Wal-
lace (1975, 1976). Besides academic and ideological convictions, the
initial debate between new Keynesian and new classical streams of
342 EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.5, n.2, p.341–359, Jul/Dec. 2004New Macroeconomics and Credibility Analysis
thought is relevant to the extent that it leads to the adoption of
alternative methods of macroeconomic analysis. While the new Key-
nesian approach resorts to an examination of the microeconomic the-
ory of imperfect competition and market distortions, the new classi-
cal macroeconomics maintains the Walrasian paradigm. The concern
with the microeconomic foundations, nonetheless, has induced the
new Keynesian and new classical techniques to become more alike,
converging to the new macroeconomics (as termed, for example by
Dixon and Rankin (1995)), which assimilates insights and techniques
of both these approaches.
On more speciﬁc grounds, a fresh approach to analysis of economic
policy took oﬀ by the mid 1980s, applying the idea of time inconsis-
tency of optimal choices, launched by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and modelling economic policy as the interplay of policymakers and
private agents. The policymaker is treated as an optimiser agent, who
faces political and economic constraints and responds to incentives.
One of the main results of these formulations, derived ﬁrstly by Barro
and Gordon (1983a), is that discretionary monetary policy delivers
equilibrium with a higher rate of inﬂation than the equilibrium with
a monetary rule.
This paper aims to point out how and why the integration of new Key-
nesian and new classical techniques enables theorists to provide better
foundation for the positive analyses of monetary policy that follows
the inﬂuential model of Barro and Gordon (1983a). We take the view
that the positive models of inﬂation and related game-theoretic ap-
proach to economic policy were developed during the 1980s and early
1990s as a speciﬁc branch of research. The main criticism to this lit-
erature addresses the lack of microeconomic underpinnings for the
welfare functions, which are deﬁned over aggregate variables, such
as output and price level. In this paper, we make the case for argu-
ing that this theoretical vulnerability is reduced as the new macroe-
conomics develops general equilibrium frameworks with Keynesian
market imperfections that cause nominal rigidity.
To this aim, sections 2 and 3 outline the new Keynesian and new clas-
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sical macroeconomics. The comparison is conducted in terms of an im-
portant methodological diﬀerence between these streams of thought:
the new Keynesian models are built on sketchily described aggre-
gate demand, while the new classical models adopt the aggregate, in-
tertemporal competitive model of a unique representative agent, with
full description of aggregate demand dynamics. This methodological
feature is relevant for our purposes since a detailed speciﬁcation of the
aggregate demand dynamics clariﬁes the welfare costs of unexpected
inﬂation associated with the demand for money.
Then, section 4, presents the basic structure of the game-
theoretic frameworks, speciﬁcally the Barro-Gordon type models. Ex-
cessive discretionary inﬂation results when discretionary monetary
policy is conducted in a context of the market imperfections that
lead to sub-optimal equilibrium level output and this market result
can be improved through surprise inﬂation. However, inﬂation entails
also some welfare cost. Thus, frameworks that specify not only the
nature of market imperfections arising from the supply side of the
economy, but also the costs of inﬂation associated with preferences
and budget constraints, give more internal consistency for the positive
models of discretionary inﬂation.
The argument that the notion of excessive discretionary inﬂation be-
comes less arbitrary as new Keynesian and new classical techniques
are integrated is squarely in two controversial aspects of the modern
macroeconomics: the requirement of microeconomic foundations for
macroeconomic analysis and adoption of the average representative
agent formulation in macro models.
Although the desirability of microeconomic foundation is not an ab-
solute consensus among economists (for example, Rothschild (1988)
and Hoover (2001) discuss this issue), it is arguably true that great
part of the macroeconomic theorists, in accepting the rational expec-
tations hypothesis, are seriously concerned with the fundamentals of
the macroeconomic equilibrium concepts. As acknowledged by Lucas
(1981), this is, indeed, the motivation that has shortened distance
between new Keynesian and new classical methodologies.
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Once one accepts that the microeconomic bases of policy analysis
should be provided, a rather controversial issue is that of whether or
not a representative agent formulation of general equilibrium actually
gives solid microeconomic foundation for welfare analysis. The argu-
ment that the merging of new classical and new Keynesian macroeco-
nomics oﬀers better micro foundation for the Barro-Gordon model is
in line with the position that representative agent formulations are vi-
able ways of avoiding the main diﬃculties of deriving macroeconomic
equilibrium from microeconomic principles, namely the problem of
aggregation and multiplicity of possible equilibrium results.
However, many theorists, especially those who deal with Walrasian
welfare analysis, protest against the claim that representative agent
settings are valid general equilibrium formulations. Indeed, neoclas-
sical theorists address viable criticism to general equilibrium formu-
lations of the representative agent by pointing out that the
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem indicates a clear disjuncture
between microeconomic behaviour and macroeconomic results. With
this respect, Kirman (1992) and Hartley et al. (1998), for example,
give a perspective on the ways the representative agent model can be
misleading.
Further objections may still arise on a less technical front, as the rep-
resentative agent formulations downplay the role of diﬀerent prefer-
ences and production constraints that determine the macroeconomic
equilibrium (a discussion is oﬀered by Rothschild (1995)). Neverthe-
less, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, chapter 1) observe that there are
good reasons for taking the representative agent device as a starting
point. First, there are important cases where the use of the represen-
tative consumer to describe macroeconomic behaviour can rigorously
be justiﬁed (a discussion is oﬀered by Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980,
chap. 6). Moreover, many good insights into the macroeconomy are
independent of the household’s diﬀerent preferences.
In the models of discretionary inﬂation and credibility analysis, the
existence of a ﬁnite level of equilibrium inﬂation rate requires that
inﬂation entails not only a social beneﬁt, but also a social cost. Thus,
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it is arguably the case that pinpointing the costs and beneﬁts of un-
expected inﬂation in terms of an aggregate intertemporal model of a
unique average representative agent is a less arbitrary procedure than
postulating an ad hoc macro welfare function. Also, it is widely ac-
knowledged among macroeconomists that judging alternative policy
actions by taking into account the variety of individual preferences
may become analytically intractable. In this way, one must keep in
mind that providing better microeconomic foundation for the posi-
tive models of discretionary inﬂation within a new macroeconomic
framework should be taken as a reasonable starting point for fur-
ther research on internal consistency of the macro models of positive
monetary policy.
The next section gives a broad idea of new Keynesian macroeco-
nomics. Then, section 3 compares the new Keynesian and new clas-
sical macroeconomics. Section 4 points out the basic structure of the
models of credibility analysis and excessive discretionary inﬂation.
Section 5 gives some insights on the reasons why the new Keynesian
macroeconomics alone cannot provide microeconomic foundations for
the models of credibility analysis and excessive discretionary inﬂa-
tion. Section 6 summarises the conclusions. Finally, the references
are listed.
2 New Keynesian Macroeconomics
Although ﬁxed prices is an essential assumption supporting the Key-
nesian macroeconomics formalised by the IS-LM model, there
is not an explicit microeconomic theory of prices and wages beneath
the IS-LM framework. In this sense, the Keynesian paradigm is
completely detached from the basic microeconomic notion that eco-
nomic decisions result from individual optimisation. For this reason,
the Keynesian paradigm was ﬁercely criticised by the new classical
economists in the late 70s.
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The viable objections to the ad hoc hypotheses about nominal rigidity
seriously compromise the Keynesian view of short run ﬂuctuations,
since these are based on price/wage stickiness. The Keynesian re-
sponse to this criticism yields the new Keynesian approach, which is
a switch of focus from the role and eﬀectiveness of economic policy
to the provision of a microeconomic foundation for nominal rigidity.
The term new Keynesian macroeconomics was ﬁrst employed by
Parkin (1986) and then popularised by Gordon (1990) and Mankiw
and Romer (1991, Introduction). Two distinguish characteristics can
arguably identify the new Keynesian literature. One of them is that
the research agenda is conditioned by the search for microeconomic
foundations for the hypothesis of nominal rigidity of prices and wages.
The second one is that such foundations are taken from the microe-
conomic theory of imperfect competition and market distortions. In
this sense, the assumptions of monopolistic competition and menu
costs are the base of the new Keynesian macroeconomics. Also, the
assumption of monopolistic competition in the strong form allows for
modelling the economy in terms of representative agent.
The formulation of the assumption of monopolistic competition con-
sists of considering a continuum of ﬁrms/producers (or workers, if it
refers to the labour market). Each producer produces a diﬀerentiated
good. More important, each individual is small enough to have no in-
ﬂuence on the aggregate variables, especially the aggregate price level.
In such a context, the process of decision on prices can be deﬁned ac-
cording to the Nash assumption that each producer determines his
price by taking others’ prices as given. This corresponds to the as-
sumption of monopolistic competition in the strong form (Nishimura,
1995; Introduction).
The assumption of monopolistic competition has two important char-
acteristics: ﬁrst, it leads to aggregate demand externalities or inter-
dependence of individual decisions. Second, it does not imply price
rigidity. This means that another market imperfection must be added
in order to obtain price rigidity. Therefore, Blanchard and Kiyotaki
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(1987) add the assumption of menu costs to monopolistic competi-
tion.
Menu costs correspond to those of changing tags and therefore, are
very small costs. Mankiw (1985) uses the formulation of near ratio-
nality, due to Akerlof and Yellen (1985) to show that such small costs
can produce price rigidity. The basic insight is that, like any other
economic decision, adjusting prices is an action based on a rational
comparison between cost and beneﬁt.
The formal argument is that, at the position of maximum util-
ity/proﬁt, the agents are indiﬀerent to a further increase/decrease
in the value of their utility/proﬁt. In this case, if moving position
along the utility function entails any cost, it is rational (ie, near ra-
tional) to stay at the initial position, which is close to, but not exactly
the point of maximum utility, as long as the cost of moving is higher
than the utility/proﬁt gain.
Therefore, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) use the fact that the proﬁt func-
tions are ﬂat at the top to derive the result that the beneﬁt from not
reoptimising and setting prices optimally after a nominal shock can
be quite small. The rationale for the argument is as follows. When
prices are set optimally, the ﬁrms are at the maximum point of the
proﬁt function, and in this region of the curve the value of the proﬁt
function is nearly insensitive to small deviations of the price from its
optimal value. This implies that the proﬁt loss associated with non-
reoptimisation after a demand shock is indeed very small, provided
that the shock is also small.
Such a simple formulation provides rationality for price rigidity fol-
lowing a nominal shock. However, if changing prices is a strategy that
depends also on the others’ decision, which is the case in a context
of monopolistic competition, the costs of not changing price, ie not
moving along the proﬁt function, increases as the others do change
theirs. In this case, changing prices are complement strategies.
Therefore, interdependence of price decisions, or aggregate demand
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externality, combined with the formulation of menu costs leads to the
result of multiple equilibria. This is the most important characteristic
of the macroeconomic model of monopolistic competition: menu costs
with strategic complementarity leads to the possibility of either ﬂex-
ible or rigid prices being an outcome. The fact that a Pareto inferior
equilibrium may be attained characterises a coordination failure.
3 Supply-side Versus New Keynesian Macroeconomics
Among the characteristics associated with the Keynesian view of the
behaviour of the economy, the most signiﬁcant is the refusal of the
assumptions of universal markets clearing and perfect competition.
This leads the new Keynesian models to abandon the Walrasian auc-
tioneer at least in one market and, from a technical viewpoint, the
decisions on production, wages and prices are derived from strate-
gic behaviour. This is the case because the particular aim is to ra-
tionalise nominal rigidity and, consequently, the essential task is to
justify demand-determined output.
On the other hand, the new classical approach follows the Walrasian
paradigm and explains the business cycle by shifts in technology,
which correspond to real shocks to the supply side of the economy.
Because the real business cycle approach assumes that the ﬂuctua-
tions in aggregate output result from technology shocks, the demand
side of the economy needs to be well speciﬁed in order to describe
the reaction of aggregate demand to such shocks.
Therefore, the real business cycle approach tends to be built on full
general equilibrium frameworks in which aggregate demand is ob-
tained from optimisation principles. Seminal papers are Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983). The term “real” busi-
ness cycle follows the terminology used by Long and Plosser (1983)
and refers to the fact that the monetary side of the economy is ab-
stracted away by such models. This makes sense, since the classical
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dichotomy is accepted, and so, money is assumed to be neutral by
the new classical macroeconomists.
Keynesians, on the other hand, reject the classical dichotomy and
contend that money does aﬀect real variables, at least in the short
run. Thus, the business cycle could result from the sluggish response
of nominal variables to monetary shocks. This means that nominal
rigidity is the key factor to explain the business cycle. Since the new
Keynesian approach concentrates on the behaviour of ﬁrms and work-
ers, it emphasises the supply side of the economy. Thus, the charac-
terisation of aggregate demand is simpliﬁed as much as possible. In
this sense, although new Keynesian models of nominal rigidity do
consider the monetary side of the economy, for most of them (for
example, Ball (1994)) this is not modelled from ﬁrst principles of
optimisation. Exceptions to this are approaches to menu cost that
introduce money into the economy by assuming a cash-in-advance
constraint like the model of menu costs in Ball and Romer (1991).
While the causes of movements in the money supply are not central,
and the debate over the control of aggregate demand is not associ-
ated with the new Keynesian approaches to the aggregate supply, the
control of aggregate demand is an important aspect of real business
cycle approaches. This is so because such models assume that the ag-
gregate supply curve is always vertical and real output is unaﬀected
by movements of aggregate demand. Correspondingly, the behaviour
of aggregate demand accounts for the short run variations of nominal
variables.
In new Keynesian models, on the other hand, the aggregate price
level usually exhibits some sort of stickiness and the movements in
the nominal variables must aﬀect the real output, no matter what
the causes of such movements are. This suggests that the eﬀective-
ness of monetary policy depends essentially on the behaviour of the
price level, which is determined by frictions in price setting at the mi-
croeconomic level. Consequently, these diﬀerences in methodologies
between the new Keynesian and new classical approaches have some
implications for the development of models of economic policy, in the
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sense that a more consistent theory of economic policy requires full
rationalisation of the objectives of economic policy and, therefore,
some characteristics of the new Keynesian and real business cycle
approaches have been combined.
4 The New Theory of Economic Policy
While the new Keynesian macroeconomics concentrates eﬀort on de-
riving the desired Keynesian features from optimisation principles,
the theory of economic policy applies such principles also to political
decisions. However, the weakness of this theory is that the objective
functions are ad hoc speciﬁcations of the policymaker’s preferences.
In a sense, this theory of economic policy is built up on the grounds
of the neoclassical economics for it is based on the speciﬁcation of ob-
jectives and constraints that give rise to equilibrium outcomes. Also,
prices are assumed to be perfectly ﬂexible (Buiter (1980), was the
ﬁrst to introduce price stickiness into a new classical framework).
In this regard, the early analyses of credibility of economic policy
are a straight application of the Lucas critique, which brings the no-
tion that the eﬀectiveness of economic policy depends on how private
agents incorporate that policy in their objective functions and on
how they react to such a policy. The agents’ decision rules do not
necessarily remain invariant to shifts in policy. This also implies that
a speciﬁc macroeconomic basis is necessary to understand how the
agents’ decision rules may react to major changes in economic policy.
On the other hand, the theory of economic policy also has a strong
Keynesian ﬂavour in which the existence of market distortions in
a short-run Phillips curve are essential for the result of excessive
discretionary inﬂation. Indeed, the starting point of this theory is
that the monetary authority is tempted to cause surprise inﬂation,
since this induces the economy to attain temporary equilibrium at a
higher level of output. The motivation for the monetary authority to
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do so lies in the assumption that, due to market distortions, such as
taxation or imperfect competition, the full employment equilibrium
level of output is below the socially eﬃcient level.
The behaviour of the aggregate demand is extremely important for
the analysis of monetary policy for this latter depends on the exis-
tence of a short run expectational Phillips curve. Despite that, the
microeconomic foundations for the demand for money are not mod-
elled by the early approaches of credibility, for example, Backus and
Driﬃll (1985a,b) and Andersen (1989). Such arbitrariness has always
been criticised, since it compromises the welfare conclusions of the
models of credibility. Person and Tabellini (1990) and Blackburn and
Christensen (1989) survey the main branches of this literature.
To state the context in which the monetary authority may have a
problem of credibility, four basic characteristics of the standard for-
mulations can be identiﬁed: (i) policy decisions are made in a context
of a game between private agents and the policy authority; (ii) out-
put is determined by a short-run expectational Phillips curve; (iii) the
existence of some market distortion causes the full employment level
of output to be suboptimum; (iv) unanticipated inﬂation is costly.
Assumption (i) is an extension to the Lucas critique, while assump-
tions (ii) and (iii) are essentially Keynesian features. Assumption (iv)
is probably correct, but the way it enters these formulations makes
it a disputable claim.
When the private agents make a decision before the monetary au-
thority or if they can be misled when forming expectations about
inﬂation, the monetary authority can inﬂuence the short run real
output by setting actual inﬂation higher than expected. Such con-
ditions create the incentives for the policymaker to depart from the
announced rate of inﬂation, usually assumed to be zero, once the full
employment level of output is below the eﬃcient level (assumption
iii). More speciﬁcally, in a discretionary policy regime the monetary
authority can reoptimise at each period, and therefore it is able to
change the policy in a second round of measures.
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If, for example, an announced zero inﬂation policy is believed, the
policymaker who is more concerned with the employment level than
price stabilisation may ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from the announced
policy and cause surprise inﬂation. However, in a context of rational
expectations equilibrium, the private agents anticipate incentives for
surprise inﬂation.
With full information, the agents know the preferences of the policy-
maker and are aware of the temptation to abandon the announced
policy targets. As a result, the policy game yields equilibrium ag-
gregate output at the natural level and a positive rate of inﬂation.
Therefore, a discretionary regime with rational expectations yields an
ineﬃcient outcome, since positive inﬂation is assumed to be socially
ineﬃcient. In such a situation, a credible equilibrium policy rule can
be derived only by imposing a credibility constraint on the policy-
maker’s problem: the monetary authority must have no incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium policy rule.
In a regime of pre-commitment, on the other hand, the monetary
authority cannot deviate from the announced policy. Things hap-
pen as if both actual and expected inﬂation are predetermined, there
can be no surprises, so that the credibility constraint does not bind
the policymaker’s problem. This gives rise to the terminology “ex-
cessive inﬂation”, which refers to the fact that, under discretion, the
equilibrium inﬂation rate is higher than the one obtained when the
policymaker is able to make pre-commitments.
Assumption (iv) is essential in models of credibility. It introduces
inﬂation into the government’s cost function so that the monetary
authority cares not only about the employment level but also price
stabilisation. More important, this assumption is also a technical re-
quirement for the existence of a ﬁnite level of inﬂation that fulﬁls
both government’s and private agents’ optimisation conditions. At
the same time, it is an ad hoc assumption, since there is no fun-
damentals for the aggregate demand that leads to the explicit costs
of unexpected (or expected) inﬂation. Nonetheless, there are good
reasons for advocating that inﬂation is costly.
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The lack of microeconomic foundations for the welfare analysis im-
plies that models of credibility and excessive inﬂation implicitly as-
sume that inﬂation is costly and that zero inﬂation is the most eﬃ-
cient result (for example, Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), Backus and
Driﬃll (1985a,b)). In this sense, while the new Keynesian approach
can be coupled with the models of credibility to give a microeco-
nomic foundation for the incentives for the monetary authority to
cause surprise inﬂation, the real business cycle methodology, with
dynamic general equilibrium frameworks, allows for making the costs
of unanticipated inﬂation explicit.
This can promptly be observed, for example, in Neiss (1999) and
Bonini (2001, chap.5), which model excessive discretionary inﬂation
in a representative agent general equilibrium framework with one pe-
riod labour contracts. In Neiss (1999) and Bonini (2001, chap.5), the
costs and beneﬁts of unexpected inﬂation derive directly from the un-
derlying structure of technology, preferences and budget constraint,
so that the time consistent rate of inﬂation is obtained from the pol-
icymakers optimisation problem. Moreover, the distortions causing
equilibrium output to be lower than the socially optimum are dis-
torting taxation and monopolistic competition in the output market.
As in Barro and Gordon (1983a), the equilibrium discretionary rate
of inﬂation is biased upwards and such a bias is a function of the dis-
tortions. More important, the costs of surprise inﬂation in terms of
deterioration of the real money balances can be pinpointed and mea-
sured. Also, the adopted formulation of the consumer’s preferences
suggests that the type of budget constraint and aggregate demand are
extremely important to determine equilibrium inﬂation in a Barro-
Gordon approach to discretionary monetary policy. Such an analysis
of costs and beneﬁts of surprise inﬂation can only be performed in a
full general equilibrium model of the type of the new classical ones
with Keynesian features such as wage contracts and monopolistic
competition.
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5 Discussion
The approaches to monopolistic competition and menu costs, de-
scribed in section 2, are the core of the new Keynesian literature
because they succeed in producing the result of price/wage rigid-
ity from the principles of individual rationality (or at least near ra-
tionality). Moreover, as the macroeconomic theory progresses to a
synthesis, such formulations have been widely employed by general
equilibrium models of the type of the new classical ones, with stag-
gering of wages/prices being also incorporated to some models. A
the same time, the “old” Keynesian formulations of wage contracts
based on Gray (1976) has had to be reconciled in order to turn to
the analysis of economic policy, since the search for an ever more pre-
cise microeconomic foundation for nominal rigidity, like, for example,
the derivation of staggering from optimisation conditions, becomes
an enterprise detached from the primary motivation of Keynesian
macroeconomics, which is the analysis of economic policy.
Apart from the debate over rules versus discretion underpinning the
development of the literature on credibility, a relevant point empha-
sised in section 4 is that, in order to develop a proper analysis of cred-
ibility, the incentives for causing surprise inﬂation must be described
in terms of the policymaker’s objective function. Such incentives are,
at ﬁrst glance, associated with the possibility of increasing output
by delivering surprise inﬂation. With this respect, a more fundamen-
tal issue concerns the policymaker’s choice of optimal inﬂation: it is
the fact that such an opportunity is not available in a new Keyne-
sian context of monopolistic competition in the product market and
absence of microeconomic speciﬁcations for the aggregate demand.
That is the case of the model of monopolistic competition and menu
costs due to Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), which is the core of new
Keynesian macroeconomics. Bonini (2001), for example, show that,
in this model, the credibility issue should be associated with the de-
termination of money growth rate by the policymaker in a context of
multiple equilibria.
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Similarly, models of staggered wages can hardly provide settings for
a proper credibility analysis. For example, Ball and Cecchetti (1991)
derive the time consistent rate of inﬂation in discretionary equilibrium
with staggered wages. Although the costs and beneﬁts of unexpected
inﬂation can be identiﬁed (respectively with an increase in wage dis-
persion and a decrease of unemployment), the costs of inﬂation due to
its impact on the real money balances are left aside in their model.
The reason is that, following the new Keynesian way of modelling
macroeconomics, especially the approaches of wage indexation and
staggered wages, their aggregate demand is predetermined.
Yet, some recent formulations, like Neiss (1999), for example, derive
excessive discretionary inﬂation in general equilibrium contexts and
can pinpoint the costs of unexpected inﬂation in terms of the fun-
damentals of the demand for money, while the beneﬁts of inﬂation
arise from the existence of market imperfections, such as the exis-
tence of labour contract. One needs still to keep in mind, however,
that developments in this line are representative agent formulations
of general equilibrium. As such, they may be taken as a starting point
of the research on microeconomic foundation for the policy analysis
of excessive discretionary inﬂation.
6 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper has been to point out how the for-
mulations of excessive discretionary inﬂation become less arbitrary
as the macroeconomic theory progresses to a synthesis. To this aim,
in section 2 we described the main features of the new Keynesian
macroeconomics as basically a theory of the supply side of the econ-
omy. Then, we compared the new Keynesian macroeconomics with
the new classical macroeconomics, which concentrates on the descrip-
tion of aggregate demand and consider that the business cycle is ex-
plained by real shocks to elements of aggregate supply.
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In section 4 we identiﬁed the main elements of the theory of economic
policy based on credibility analysis, reaching the conclusion that a
full development of the theory of economic policy based on credibil-
ity analysis has required a consistent description of both the supply
side and the demand side of the economy. Given the methodology of
the new Keynesian and new classical macroeconomics described in
sections 2 and 3, it is arguably the case that the reconciliation of new
Keynesian and new classical techniques permitted the new theory
of economic policy, especially the Barro-Gordon model of excessive
discretionary inﬂation, to be grounded.
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